The Vietnam War Case Study
We're still writing up our story of the Vietnam War, but here are our notes so far. If you're interested to see how we build the story, come back from time-to-time. Obviously a story of such magnitude takes some time to research. One of the first sources we're drawing upon is Robert S. McNamara, Secretary of Defense to both Presidents Kennedy and Johnson, who gives an honest, heartfelt account of what happened. Highly recommended reading.
We of the Kennedy and Johnson administrations who participated in the decisions on Vietnam acted according to what we thought were the principles and traditions of this nation. We made our decisions in light of those values.
Yet we were wrong, terribly wrong.
I had never visited Indochina, nor did I understand or appreciate its history, language, culture, or values… When it came to Vietnam, we found ourselves setting policy for a region that was terra incognita. "In Retrospect" by Robert S. McNamara
“The primary problem in South Vietnam is not a military problem. The primary problem is a political and economic problem. Unless we can introduce political and economic stability in that country, there is not any possibility of a military solution.”
McNamara testifying before the Senate Appropriations Committee on July 22, 1964.
It demonstrates a point I made before: top government officials need specialists – experts – at their elbows when they make decisions on matters outside their own experience. If we had had more Asia experts around us, perhaps we would not have been so simpleminded about China and Vietnam. We had that expertise available during the Cuban Missile Crisis; in general, we had it available when we dealt with Soviet affairs; but we lacked it when dealing with Southeast Asia. "In Retrospect" by Robert S. McNamara
With hindsight, it seems painfully clear... pursuing our program to the point where the South Vietnamese asked us to leave or a chaotic situation developed that forced us to withdraw our advisers – would have cost the United States far less in lives lost, resources expended, and erosion of our containment policy. It is clear that disengagement was the course we should have chosen.
We did not.
“Negotiation as a cover for the abandonment of Southeast Asia to the Communist North cannot be accepted.”
Dean Rusk, Secretary of State, 1961-1969.
President Johnson’s fears about failure in Vietnam made him accept bombing, overriding whatever hesitation he still harbored about South Vietnam’s instability. As a result, sustained US bombing of North Vietnam, kept secret from the American public, finally began on March 2 (1965). On that day over 100 aircraft launched from carriers in the South China Sea and air bases in South Vietnam struck an ammunition depot in North Vietnam. Operation Rolling Thunder, as the air program came to be known, had begun. It would continue for three years and drop more bombs on Vietnam than had been dropped on all of Europe in World War II. "In Retrospect" by Robert S. McNamara
Two negotiating proposals existed by early April. United Nations Secretary-General U Thant proposed a three-month ceasefire across the border between North and South Vietnam, and seventeen non-aligned nations called for negotiations “without preconditions”. President Johnson dismissed the former but responded to the latter in a major speech at Johns Hopkins University on April 7 (1965).
In this speech, he broadcast his readiness for unconditional discussions. At the same time, he emphasized, “We will not be defeated. We will not grow tired. We will not withdraw, whether openly or under the cloak of a meaningless agreement… And we must be prepared for a long continued conflict.” Seeking to coax the Vietcong and North Vietnamese into a settlement, he then outlined a billion-dollar development plan for Southeast Asia, which he said was “within the reach of a cooperative and determined effort”.
Hanoi quickly denounced the speech and advanced their own “Four Points” peace formula, which remained their basis for settlement through the conflict. They proposed that we recognize the Vietnamese people’s basic national rights, including the right to live without foreign troops; that Vietnam’s two “zones” abstain from any foreign military alliances pending reunification; and that reunification be settled by the Vietnamese people in both zones. All of this we could accept. But the final point – that “the internal affairs of South Vietnam must be settled by the South Vietnamese people themselves in accordance with the program of South Vietnamese National Front for Liberation" - proved the crux of dispute. Accepting it meant accepting Communist control of South Vietnam. "In Retrospect" by Robert S. McNamara
… the Vietcong and North Vietnamese still largely controlled their casualties in a guerilla war in jungle terrain by choosing where, when, and how long to fight. What is more, by the spring of 1967 they possessed sufficient forces to prevent any substantial extension of the pacification program – particularly in the rural areas where most South Vietnamese lived. "In Retrospect" by Robert S. McNamara
Westy’s {William C. Westmoreland, Commander, US Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (1964-1968) and US Army Chief of Staff (1968-1972)} attrition strategy relied heavily on firepower. Shells and napalm rained down on Vietcong and North Vietnamese base areas in South Vietnam. It often proved difficult to distinguish combatants from noncombatants. Between 1965 and 1967, US and South Vietnamese air forces dropped over a million tons of bombs on the South, more than twice the tonnage dropped on the North. Fighting produced more and more civilian casualties and squalid refugee camps. The increasing destruction and misery brought on the country we were supposed to be helping troubled me greatly. "In Retrospect" by Robert S. McNamara
Meanwhile, the air war intensified. Sorties against North Vietnam grew from 25,000 in 1965 to 79,000 in 1966 to 108,000 in 1967, and the tonnage of bombs dropped rose from 63,000 to 136,000 to 226,000. Bombing inflicted damage on the North; it diverted manpower and resources that otherwise might have gone to military uses; it hampered the movement of men and supplies to the South. But there was a heavy price: American pilots were lost; captured US airmen provided Hanoi with hostages; the number of civilian casualties multiplied. Moreover, the continued pounding of a small nation by a superpower gave the North Vietnamese a powerful propaganda tool. And, in the end, bombing did not achieve its basic goals; as Rolling Thunder intensified, US intelligence estimated that infiltration increased from about 35,000 men in 1965 to as many as 90,000 in 1967, while Hanoi’s will to carry on the right stayed firm. "In Retrospect" by Robert S. McNamara
I did not believe that strategic bombing would work unless it targeted production sources, denied access to basic products, and prevented the use of substitute products and means. But production sources for North Vietnam and the Vietcong lay in the Soviet Union and China. The United States could not reasonably target those sources except by political (not military) means. Similarly, I believed that bombing to interdict the flow of men and supplies would work only in specific instances. It was unlikely to be effective in North Vietnam and Laos because of the nature of the terrain, the low volumes of supplies required, and ability to substitute alternative routes and means of distribution, especially in North Vietnam’s manpower-intensive environment. All this lead me to conclude that no amount of bombing of the North – short of genocidal destruction, which no one contemplated – could end the war. The Joint Chiefs felt differently and pressed for a more ambitious bombing program in the spring of 1966…
Finally, in late June 1966, we authorized the attacks…
The Vietnam war is unpopular in this country. It is becoming increasingly unpopular as it escalates – causing more American casualties, more fear of its growing into a wider war, more privation of the domestic sector, and more distress at the amount of suffering being visited on the noncombatants in Vietnam, South and North. Most Americans do not know how we got where we are, and most, without knowing why, but taking advantage of hindsight, are convinced that somewhere we should not have gotten this deeply in. All want the war ended and expect their president to end it. Successfully. Or else. (May 19, 1967) "In Retrospect" by Robert S. McNamara
Aubrac and Marcovich (French intermediaries to North Vietnam during the Pennsylvania peace initiative) then met with Premier Pham Van Dong for lengthy discussions. Following their presentation, the Premier said, “We want an unconditional end of bombing and if that happens, there will be no further obstacles to negotiations.” (July 1968) "In Retrospect" by Robert S. McNamara
McNamara's Major Causes of Disaster
... if we are to learn from our experience in Vietnam, we must first pinpoint our failures. There were eleven major causes for our disaster in Vietnam.
1. We misjudged then – as we have since – the geopolitical intention of our adversaries (in this case, North Vietnam and the Vietcong, supported by China and the Soviet Union), and we exaggerated the dangers to the United States of their actions.
2. We viewed the people and leaders of South Vietnam in terms of our own experience. We saw in them a thirst for – and a determination to fight for – freedom and democracy. We totally misjudged the political forces within the country.
3. We underestimated the power of nationalism to motivate a people (in this case, the North Vietnam and Vietcong) to fight and die for their beliefs and values – and we continue to do so today in many parts of the world.
4. Our misjudgements of friend and foe alike reflected our profound ignorance of the history, culture, and politics of the people in the area, and their personalities and habits of their leaders. We might have made similar misjudgements regarding the Soviets during our frequent confrontations – over Berlin, Cuba, the Middle East, for example – had we not had the advice of Tommy Thompson, Chip Bohlen, and George Kennan. These senior diplomats had spent decades studying the Soviet Union, its people and its leaders, why they behaved as they did, and how they would react to our actions. Their advice proved invaluable in shaping our judgements and decisions. No Southeast Asian counterparts existed for senior officials to consult when making decisions on Vietnam.
5. We failed then – as we have since – to recognize the limitations of modern, high-technology military equipment, forces, and doctrine in confronting unconventional, highly motivated people’s movements. We failed as well to adapt our military tactics to the task of winning the hearts and minds of people from a totally different culture.
6. We failed to draw Congress and the American people into a full and frank discussion and debate of the pros and cons of a large-scale US military involvement in Southeast Asia before we initiated the action.
7. After the action got under way and unanticipated events forced us off our planned course, we failed to retain popular support in part because we did not explain fully what was happening and why we were doing what we did. We had not prepared the public to understand the complex events we faced and how to react constructively to the need for changes in course as the nation confronted uncharted seas and an alien environment. A nation’s deepest strength lies not in its military prowess but, rather, in the unity of its people. We failed to maintain it.
8. We did not recognize that neither our people nor our leaders are omniscient. Where our own security is not directly at stake, our judgement of what is in another people’s or country’s best interests should be put to the test of open discussion in international forums. We do not have the God-given right to shape every nation in our own image or as we choose.
9. We did not hold to the principle that US military action – other than in response to direct threats to our own security – should be carried out only in conjunction with multinational forces supported fully (and not merely cosmetically) by the international community.
10. We failed to recognise that in international affairs, as in other aspects of life, there may be problems for which there are no immediate solutions. For one whose life has been dedicated to the belief and practice of problem solving, this is particularly hard to admit. But, at times, we may have to live with an imperfect, untidy world.
11. Underlying many of these errors lay our failure to recognise the top echelons of the Executive branch to deal effectively with the extraordinarily complex range of political and military issues, involving the great risks and costs – including, above all else, loss of life – associated with the application of military force under substantial constraints over a long period of time. Such organisational weakness would have been costly had this been the only task confronting the President and his advisers. It, of course, was not. It coexisted with the wide array of other domestic and international problems confronting us. We failed to analyse and debate our actions in Southeast Asia – our objectives, the risks, and costs of alternative ways of dealing with them, and the necessity of changing course when failure was clear – with the intensity and thoroughness that characterized the debates of the Executive Committee during the Cuban Missile Crisis.
And here are our notes from the North Vietnamese perspective, taken from "Victory in Vietnam - The Official History of the People's Army of Vietnam, 1954-1975" by The Military History Institute of Vietnam:
Although the United States had directly assisted the French during the Indochina war of aggression (1945-1954) and was a participant in the Geneva Conference, President Eisenhower announced that "the US is not bound by the terms of this agreement."
The Party Central Committee and Chairman Ho Chi Minh correctly assessesd the aggressive nature of the Amercian imperialists and closely monitored their schemes and actions. In mid-July 1954, even before the Geneva Convention had ended, Ho Chi Minh clearly stated that "the US is not only the enemy of the people of the world, it has now become the principal, direct enemy of the people of Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia." Uncle Ho said our policy was to "concentrate our forces to oppose the American imperialists."
This statement marked the dawn of a new era in the history of our nation, the era of opposing the Americans to save our nation.
The population of South Vietnam did not enjoy a single day of peace after the Geneva Agreement was signed. From the very beginning the battle against this new enemy was a vicious struggle. "Victory in Vietnam" by The Military History Institute of Vietnam
In 1958 the people of the North began a three-year plan for economic reform and cultural development (1958-1960). In the South, after establishing a governing apparatus from the national level down to the grass roots, the US-Diem clique openly tore up the Geneva Accords, refusing to meet with the Government of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam to discuss holding general elections to unify the nation. In March 1956 Diem's puppet govenment held elections to try to legitimize the puppet government. South Vietnam was placed under the umbrella of protection of the South-East Asian military bloc (SEATO). The US-Diem clique made "denouncing Communists and eliminating Communists" their national policy and they savagely terrorised Party members, patriots who had particiapted in the resistance against the French, people sympathetic toward the revolution, and anyone who did not agree with their policy of selling out the nation, serving as lackeys of the American imperialists, and dividing the nation and the Vietnamese race. "Victory in Vietnam" by The Military History Institute of Vietnam
... the resistance war against the French imperialists and the American interventionists... "Victory in Vietnam" by The Military History Institute of Vietnam
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